

The Futures of Conflict: Exploring the Use of Comparative Scenarios in Track II Peacebuilding

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This paper develops a prototype for a new type of conflict analysis tool designed to be used as part of a Track II peacebuilding process. The tool, termed Conflict Analysis through the Structured Evaluation of Scenarios (CASES), provides information on relevant comparative cases by systematically analyzing cases from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set. From these 285 groups in the data set, the CASES report identifies five *comparison cases*, designed to illuminate potential future trajectories of the *subject case*, the Kurds. In the CASES report, each of the comparison cases represents a scenario, a possible future of the subject case. The report therefore contains five brief narratives that describe the Kurdish case *as if* they were the subject cases. The report is designed to be used as part of a Track II peacebuilding process.

Keywords: conflict analysis, Track II, peacebuilding, data sets

Introducing CASES

The Guyanese man asked politely, “How’d they fix it?” He was referring to the ethnic situation in Trinidad, which was being discussed during a conflict management workshop in Guyana.¹ This man not only understood very well the problems in Guyana, but he also understood that other societies must have faced similar problems. He simply wanted to know what they did and if it worked. Below we develop a prototype for a new type of conflict analysis tool designed to provide this type of information in a manner that is both timely and accessible to local and international conflict managers.² We call this tool Conflict Analysis through the Structured Evaluation of Scenarios (CASES).

CASES provides this comparative information by systematically analyzing cases from the comprehensive data sets housed at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. In this paper, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set is used to develop a prototype CASES report on the Kurds in Turkey.

¹Of course, the ethnic situation in Trinidad has not been “fixed.” The man was reacting to the point that Trinidad seems to be managing its ethnic relations better than Guyana at the moment. Trinidad and Guyana have a similar set of ethnic issues. The primary ethnic tension in both countries is between descendants of Africans brought to the Caribbean as slaves and descendants of Indians brought to the Caribbean as indentured servants after slavery was outlawed throughout the British Empire.

²The term conflict manager refers to any individual who is seeking to prevent conflict, resolve conflict, or mitigate the effects of conflict. Local conflict managers can include everyone from a small town mayor to the head of a women’s group to the owner of a large corporation.

The MAR project monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically active communal groups in all countries in the world with a current population of at least 500,000. It currently includes data on 285 groups. From these 285 groups, the CASES report identifies five *comparison cases*, designed to illuminate potential future trajectories of the *subject case*, the Kurds. In the current paper, the comparison cases are the Palestinians in Israel, the Tibetans in China, the Basques in Spain, the Azerbaijanis in Iran, and the Québécois in Canada. The methodology for how these comparison cases were chosen is described below.

In the CASES report, each of the comparison cases represents a scenario, a possible future of the subject case. The report therefore contains five brief narratives that describe the Kurdish case *as if* they were the subject cases. For instance, one of the narratives below describes a potential future in which the Kurdish conflict follows a trajectory similar to the case of the Basques in Spain.

A CASES report is designed to be used as part of a Track II peacebuilding process. Joseph Montville, who coined the term Track II, defines it as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict” (Montville, 1991:262).³ Ideally, the report would be used as part of a series of workshops, often referred to as problem-solving workshops or interactive conflict resolution (ICR), held to assist local conflict managers to both better understand the conflict they are addressing and to identify effective peacebuilding interventions.

Thus, it is important to understand that this paper is about process, not outcomes. It describes how CASES can be used as part of a participatory process to reach conclusions about potentially effective peacebuilding interventions. As this participatory process is necessary, the paper itself does not reach conclusions about what these interventions might be.⁴

CASES and Existing Forms of Conflict Analysis

Before proceeding to the CASES report, it will be useful to situate the CASES approach vis-à-vis other forms of conflict analysis. Much conflict analysis is undertaken for the purpose of developing early warning mechanisms. Several organizations have developed methodologies for evaluating which countries are most at risk for conflict in the near future.⁵ However, almost by definition, early warning systems are based on a binary distinction, conflict/no-conflict. As a result, they provide little guidance for the analyst regarding how to respond to a situation the data have identified as high-risk: nor should it be, as this is not the role of early warning risk assessments.

The CASES approach provides a method of moving beyond risk assessment. Although the approach is rooted in the same (or similar) data as that used for early warning, the method allows the analyst to devise peacebuilding strategies by evaluating the various trajectories that a conflict in a high-risk country may follow.

A second set of conflict analysis strategies has been developed by international development organizations. In the past 5–10 years, the international development community has become more aware of the importance of understanding what effect development programming has on conflict. This idea has led to the devel-

³Track II processes are often referred to as interactive conflict resolution or simply as “problem-solving.” For more information on Track II conflict management, see Davies and Kaufman (2002) and Saunders (2000). For good case studies, see Kaufman and Sosnowski (2004), Large (1997). Fisher (2000) is a very useful collection of Track II strategies.

⁴The CASES project is also working on policy analysis tools that require less consultation.

⁵Examples include Swisspeace’s FAST program (Swisspeace, 2004), the International Crisis Group (International Crisis Group, 2004), and the Center for International Development and Conflict Management’s *Peace and Conflict Series* (Marshall and Gurr, 2003).

opment of several conflict analysis frameworks. The most prominent are those of The World Bank, USAID, The Department for International Development-U.K. (DfID), and the consortium of the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), Saferworld, and International Alert.⁶

The debate regarding these models usually centers on the pros and cons of creating a generalized framework versus conducting context-specific analysis. The World Bank, for instance, has developed a set of indicators designed to be used for every country in which an analysis is to be done. In contrast, the FEWER project seeks to “Root [the] resource manual in practice as reflected in Kenya, Uganda, Sri Lanka . . .” The other frameworks fall somewhere in between, using a mix of generalized indicators and context-specific analysis.

Clearly, there are pros and cons to each approach depending on the purposes of the analysis. However, there is an often-unrecognized problem with *both* approaches. While the design of the conflict analysis frameworks is informed by the study of other cases, none of these mentioned above has a mechanism for identifying similar conflicts in other parts of the world and then understanding what lessons those cases could impart as part of the analysis process itself. For instance, a recent USAID Conflict Vulnerability Assessment reviewed by the author discussed the danger of “Colombianization”, but the comparison was left as a vague analogy. No systematic comparison is undertaken.

Systematic comparison with other similar cases is also not a part of traditional interactive conflict resolution (ICR) or problem-solving workshops. In a useful and detailed summary of the ICR process, Harold H. Saunders (2000) makes no reference to the use of comparative cases during the dialoguing process, which is at the heart of ICR. While the lessons learned from other cases *are* often brought into the dialogue process as a result of the facilitator’s interventions, only cases with which the facilitators are familiar can be used in this way. Even with the most experienced facilitation team, this is a limited number of cases. In contrast, the CASES approach creates the ability to access hundreds of cases in order to inform the dialogue process.

It should be reiterated here that many local conflict managers are eager, at times desperate, for this type of comparative information. In addition to the Guyana example already mentioned, CIDCM was also recently approached by organizations from Mostar, Bosnia. These groups wanted a concrete analysis of Mostar’s and Bosnia’s prospects for transition to a more peaceful and democratic future, given what we know happened in other cities and regions.⁷

Scenario Planning and the Mont Fleur Scenarios

The CASES approach is inspired by a strategic planning approach known in the business world as scenario planning. Pierre Wack, who pioneered the use of scenario planning at Royal Dutch Shell, describes its purpose in this way: “Scenario planning is a discipline for rediscovering the original entrepreneurial power of creative foresight in contexts of accelerated change, greater complexity, and genuine uncertainty” (Global Business Network, 2004).⁸

⁶See World Bank, “Conflict Analysis Framework,” available at [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdext.nsf/67ByDocName/TheConflictAnalysisFramework/\\$FILE/CAFAugust03.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdext.nsf/67ByDocName/TheConflictAnalysisFramework/$FILE/CAFAugust03.pdf); DfID, “Conducting Conflict Assessment: Guidance Notes,” available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/conflict_assess_guidance.pdf, and the FEWER consortium’s “Resource Pack,” available at <http://pcia.fewer.org/>. A public version of the USAID conflict assessment framework is to be released.

⁷This conclusion regarding the desire of local conflict managers for information about other regions was confirmed to me by an official at the United States Institute of Peace who has conducted dozens of trainings worldwide. Personal conversation, January 2004.

⁸This quotation is taken from the website of the Global Business Network, which is largely responsible for the popularization of the scenario planning approach.

In a scenario planning exercise, senior managers of a corporation are asked to develop 3–5 scenarios, each of which represents a possible future. The scenarios are designed to provide a “learning environment in which managers can explore these forces, better understand the dynamics shaping the future and thus, assess strategic options and prepare to take strategic decisions” (Innovators of Digital Economy Alternatives).

Although this approach has been used primarily in the business world and to a lesser extent as a tool for municipal planners, scenario planning has also been used as a peacebuilding tool, most prominently in South Africa. From 1991 to 1992, the GBN facilitated a scenario planning exercise in South Africa.⁹ The Mont Fleur Project, as it came to be known, “brought together a diverse group of 22 prominent South Africans . . . to develop and disseminate a set of stories about what might happen in their country from 1992–2002” (Global Business Network, 1996:1).¹⁰ In total four stories, or scenarios, were developed:

- Ostrich: no settlement to the crisis. The South African government continues to be non-representative.
- Lame duck: settlement is achieved, but implementation is slow and indecisive.
- Icarus: settlement is achieved, but government pursues unsustainable, populist policies.
- Flight of the Flamingos: settlement is achieved and the government adopts sustainable policies, thereby moving the country toward inclusive growth and democracy.

These four scenarios were turned into brief narratives and distributed throughout South Africa, both by way of the mass media and through presentations with over fifty organizations in the public and private sectors. In its report, GBN argues that the South Africa project helped the participants, “establish a common vocabulary and mutual understanding regarding the nature of the crisis,” and, “find and enlarge the common ground regarding the participants’ views of the future of South Africa” (Global Business Network, 1996:3).

As should be clear, the CASES approach is quite similar to the scenario-planning approach used in South Africa. The key difference is that the CASES approach uses scenarios based on other similar cases of conflict. Why this different strategy? First, as people in a society experiencing violent conflict become focused on the day-to-day survival of themselves and their families, their horizons narrow. Moreover, the self-perpetuating nature of violence, and the vicious circles it creates, often makes it difficult for people to simply create alternative visions of society. It is partly for this reason that local conflict managers are so eager for information about other conflicts. They understand the insularity that violent conflict creates. The CASES approach, by drawing on other cases of conflict, provides partially formed, but empirically grounded scenarios. This gives participants some raw material to work with, as opposed to having to create a vision of the future from scratch.

Second, conflict-affected societies are almost by definition highly polarized. This means that there is little room for neutrality or objectivity. In many interactions, the messenger becomes more important than the message. The use of narratives based on actual cases helps refocus the discussion on the content of the narratives as opposed to the speaker, primarily because the scenario is not created entirely by the speaker. Of course, case-based scenarios remain open to interpretation; they do not completely solve this problem. Nonetheless, we would argue that real cases of conflict provide a more compelling vision of the future, either a desired future or a future to be avoided, than scenarios developed entirely by the workshop participants.

⁹From 1996 to 1999, GBN facilitated a similar process in Colombia, entitled *Destino Colombia*. For information on this program, see Global Business Network (1998).

¹⁰For another discussion of The Mont Fleur Scenarios, see Allan, Fairtlough, and Heinzen (2002).

CASES Report: The Kurds in Turkey

This report presents scenarios generated by using the CASES approach, including information on how those scenarios were generated. It then describes how the scenarios can be used as part of a Track II process.

Comparison Case Selection

Any selection of comparison cases has to balance comprehensiveness with pragmatic concerns regarding selecting cases in a timely manner. The comparison cases here were selected from the 285 minority groups in the MAR data set.¹¹ The benefit of using MAR is that it allows for a rapid, semi-automated review of a large number of cases, but clearly there are many cases that do not appear in the data set. If the Track II project in question has the time and the resources, further sources could be culled for relevant comparison cases. Moreover, as the integration of data sets improves, it should be possible to more rapidly search a larger number of cases.

One of the first tasks we confronted was establishing a method by which to narrow this universe of possible comparison cases.¹² A Track II approach is necessarily focused on the effects that policy interventions can have. Therefore, we wanted to control for historical factors, group characteristics, and contextual elements that scholars have shown to be significant in the genesis and unfolding of ethnic conflict. Most of these factors are outside the purview of policy manipulation by the government or international actors in the state in which a group resides. In order to focus the scenario analysis on factors that were subject to intervention, the comparison cases were selected on the basis of similarity across these more structural variables.

Selection Variables

Territorial concentration facilitates ethnic mobilization through the easier building of communication networks and shared identity (Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, and Stanton, 2002; Gurr, 2000). Additionally, certain policies of accommodation—such as autonomy agreements—may be more viable when groups are territorially concentrated. Therefore, we control for this factor in our selection of cases using the group concentration (GROUPCON) variable in MAR. Groups are coded as widely dispersed, primarily urban/minority in one region, majority in one region with others dispersed, or concentrated in one region. Kurds in Turkey are coded as a majority in one region (the south of Turkey) with other group members dispersed. We chose to eliminate as possible comparison cases all groups that were not likewise coded.

The strength and cohesiveness of group identity is another facilitator of ethnic mobilization. Groups that are fragmented are less likely to be able to overcome their collective action problem. Also, when a group is factionalized, it may be easier for the government to co-opt certain factions while isolating others. The group cohesion variable (COHESX) in MAR is used to measure the strength of group identity. Cohesion “refers to the extent to which group members have an active, self-conscious sense of group identity based on their defining traits.” The MAR cohesion variable is coded on a five-point scale, with 1 signifying no evidence of

¹¹The MAR project at the University of Maryland monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at least 500,000. The project currently provides information in a standardized format on over 285 minority groups. For more information, see <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about/types.htm>.

¹²What follows is a description of a generic case selection strategy. If the project in question allowed for early consultations with the participants, the case selection strategy would be revised to take into account the input of the participants.

collective identity to 5 signifying a strong identity group. Kurds in Turkey are coded as a factionalized group, a 3 on the scale. Since this variable is highly subjective, we decided to eliminate only those groups whose cohesion was considered lower than that of the Kurds in Turkey, keeping those groups coded as factionalized groups, weak identity groups, and strong identity groups.

Current group strategies and government attitudes towards groups are influenced by the history of state-group relations. Groups that have given rise to separatist or autonomy movements in the past are more likely to pursue such goals in the present. Additionally, governments tend to be more cautious in dealing with groups that have sought autonomy or separation in the past and may be less willing to accommodate political demands in part because of fear of the “slippery slope.” The MAR data set includes a separatism index (SEPX) that codes whether a group currently contains a separatist or autonomy movement, has given rise to such movements that persisted at least 5 years since World War II, or has had autonomy in the past. Kurds in Turkey are coded at the highest level—as a group that currently contains a separatist or autonomy movement. We chose to include only those groups that currently contain such a movement or have given rise to one since World War II.

MAR also categorizes groups by type, distinguishing two broad classes of groups, each consisting of three types. Ethnonationalists, national minorities, and indigenous peoples are classified as national peoples, while ethno-classes, communal contenders, and religious sects are classified as minority peoples. Group type is related to the goals that groups pursue and to the strategies they employ, with national peoples more likely to pursue separatist and autonomy-related goals and strategies.

Ethnonationalists and national minorities are very similar, the only difference being that national minorities have ethnic kin who are in control of an adjacent state. In contrast, indigenous groups form a quite distinct category, defined as, “conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups” (Minorities at Risk, 2004). Since Kurds in Turkey are ethnonationalist, we decided to consider for comparison only groups that fell into the ethnonationalists or national minorities category.

Finally, we decided to include for possible comparison only those groups that shared similar levels of cultural difference from the dominant group in their states. This decision was based primarily on the knowledge that the demands of Kurds in Turkey have a large cultural component. MAR codes for cultural difference based on a scale of 0–4 derived from the coding of six cultural and demographic traits (ethnicity, language, historical origin, religion, social customs, and residence). A zero on the cultural differentials scale denotes that no socially significant difference is noted; slight differentials (1) is coded when socially significant differences exist in one or two of the traits listed previously; substantial differentials (2) is coded for differences in three traits; major differentials (3) is coded for differences with respect to four qualities; extreme differentials (4) denotes differences with regard to five or six traits. Kurds in Turkey are coded as having major differentials from the dominant Turkish culture. We chose to consider as possible comparison cases only those groups that scored between a 2 and a 4 on the cultural differentials index.

A Range of Outcomes

The above criteria yielded 33 contenders for inclusion as comparison cases with the Kurds in Turkey. These cases are listed in the Appendix (Table A1). It was necessary to select a smaller number of cases from this list in order to develop a manageable number of scenarios.

The goal of any scenario-analysis exercise is to examine a range of possible futures. The most important aspect of these futures with regard to our research agenda is the relationship between the state and the minority group. Specifically, we wanted to look at the degree of violence between the minority group and the state, including how much protest the minority group is engaged in and how repressive the state is. We also wanted to look at the level of social and cultural integration between the minority group and the majority society in the state. We therefore chose cases that provided variation along these dimensions. Using this criterion, we selected the following cases as comparison cases:

1. *Palestinians in Israeli Occupied Territories: "Intractable Conflict"*

Outcome: The conflict between Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and Israel is a clear example of an intractable conflict. As with other intractable conflicts, the conflict concerns fundamental issues of identity, dignity, and justice. Mutual perceptions have become zero-sum, with many on each side perceiving the other as a threat to its very existence. Moreover, the violence between the sides has become self-reproducing—violence begets more violence and a conflict spiral is created. Despite its intractable nature, the conflict is a low-intensity conflict that has not escalated to full-scale civil war.

2. *Tibetans in China: "Successful Repression"*

Outcome: China has successfully established political control over Tibet. As a result, there is very little in the way of visible resistance to Chinese rule from within Tibet. It is difficult to know if there is active resistance within Tibet that is being successfully repressed or if past repression has removed any source of resistance. Regardless, it is the case now that virtually all protests of Chinese rule come from outside of Tibet, from the exile community, from foreign governments, and from NGOs.

3. *Basques in Spain: "No War, No Peace"*

Outcome: The situation in the Basque region of Spain at the moment can best be described as no war, no peace. ETA, the most militant Basque nationalist organization, declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1998, but ended that ceasefire in 1999 after little progress was made toward establishing a dialogue process. Currently, ETA continues to engage in small-scale violent resistance. All indications are that the vast majority in the region support a peaceful resolution to the conflict involving some form of territorial autonomy. The current autonomy arrangements grant the Basque country a wide range of powers including the right to levy taxes, establish its own police force, and to establish Basque-language education and media.

4. *Québécois in Canada: "Triumph of the Moderates"*

Outcome: The movement to gain more autonomy for Quebec within Canada emerged during the 1960s. The Parti Québécois (PQ) came into power in the late-1970s on a platform of sovereignty for Quebec, although they argued for a form of sovereignty that would include a continued association with Canada. Referendums on Quebec sovereignty were defeated in 1980 and 1995. Recently, support in the province for sovereignty and for another referendum has declined (Salée, 2003). In 2003, the PQ was defeated in provincial elections in Quebec by the Liberal Party, an outcome that was widely viewed as evidence of the change in public sentiment on Quebec sovereignty. At the same time, there is little controversy over the desig-

nation of Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada and there is widespread support for Canada’s policy of official bilingualism.

5. *Azerbaijanis in Iran: “Complex Integration”*

Outcome: In both 1920 and 1946, Azerbaijani groups launched violent revolts against the central government in Iran in an attempt to gain greater political autonomy for the predominantly Azerbaijani provinces in northwest Iran. Both revolts failed as a result of being unable to win broad support among Azerbaijanis in Iran. The outcome of these rebellions is illustrative of the current situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran. Although there is undoubtedly a politically relevant Azerbaijani, ethnic identity, Azerbaijanis are well-integrated into Iran at all levels of society. Azerbaijanis in Iran participate at the highest levels in both the government and religious arenas. The consensus view is that the many Azerbaijanis in Iran have little sense of a separate identity and those that retain a separate identity consider themselves both Azerbaijani and Iranian and see little or no contradiction between these two identities (Amirahamadi, 1987; Shaffer, 2000).

The Empirical Present

Every scenario analysis exercise begins with an analysis of the current situation, or the empirical present, as it is sometimes called. The empirical present provides the foundation upon which the potential futures are constructed, thereby grounding the analysis in reality. The following is a synopsis that represents the empirical present with regard to the case of the Kurds in Turkey.

*The Kurds in Turkey: The Current Situation*¹³

The situation of the Kurds in Turkey as of the end of 2003 is marked by two seemingly contradictory trends. On the one hand, the Turkish government policy toward the Kurds has become more conciliatory. Turkey’s desire to join the European Union has led the government to take several concrete steps to soften its policies relating to the Kurds. In 2002, the state of emergency in southeast Turkey was lifted allowing Kurds to travel freely in the region. Language policy has been softened, allowing more Kurdish language publications and privately run language courses. Kurds have also been allowed to bring court cases against the Turkish Army for crimes allegedly committed during the war against the PKK. The Turkish government has introduced an amnesty program for former PKK fighters and has agreed to provide compensation for civilians who suffered as a result of military action during the war with the PKK.

The fate of the amnesty program, however, is symbolic of a more ominous trend. As of August 2003, only eight PKK members have accepted the amnesty offer. Many Kurdish groups have complained that the changes instituted by the Turkish government, regarding the Kurdish language for instance, exist only on paper and that the situation on the ground has not changed. Moreover, there have been sporadic incidents of violence, including small firefights between the Army, policemen, and Kurdish militants, apparently from the PKK, now renamed KADEK. In September 2003, KADEK ended its unilateral ceasefire and threatened renewed violence if the Turkish government does not agree to a more comprehensive peace process.

¹³The summary represents the current situation as of May 2004. As this prototype report is meant to be illustrative, the summary may be out of date. An actual report would continue to be updated so it is current at the time the Track II effort is initiated. The summary was compiled by reviewing recent reports appearing in *Agence France Presse*, the *Associated Press*, *Economist*, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2003*, *The New Statesmen*, *The New York Times*, *NZZ Global*, *Turkish News Line*, and *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*.

The economic situation in southeast Turkey, which is predominately Kurdish, has seen little improvement. The Turkish government continues to implement a large-scale development plan for the region, the Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by its Turkish initials GAP. The plan is widely seen as designed to better integrate the Kurdish populations of southeast Turkey into the Turkish state.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the unemployment rate in the region is estimated to be between 35% and 50%. Kurds in other regions besides the southeast are often well integrated into Turkish society and face little economic discrimination.

Finally, both the war in Iraq and the terrorist bombings in Istanbul in November are likely to strengthen hardliners within the Turkish government. The threats posed by domestic terrorists and the political gains of Kurds in Iraq could be used to help justify a crackdown on Kurdish dissent within Turkey.

The Scenarios

The scenarios should be seen as seed narratives. They can be presented to participants in a workshop setting in order to spark discussion of various potential conflict trajectories. The participants should be allowed as much time as is feasible to revise and rework the scenarios. If time allows, new scenarios can also be created from the cases presented in Table A1.

Kurds as Palestinians: Intractable Conflict

Small-scale violence between KADEK and the Turkish Army and Police has escalated. The origins of the escalation are unclear, but increased violence on one side sparks a violent reaction on the other and a cycle of violence is begun.

As a result of the strength of the Turkish Army and the support it receives from the United States, the Kurdish militants increasingly turn to unconventional tactics including terrorist attacks in Istanbul and Ankara. Emboldened by the international war on terror, the Army responds to these attacks with a harsh counterinsurgency campaign, including the destruction of numerous Kurdish villages. The state of emergency in southeastern Turkey is reinstated.

The renewed cycle of violence halts any progress toward the amelioration of Kurdish grievances. Moreover, both the terrorist attacks and the counterinsurgency campaign eliminate any political space for moderate Kurds. Kurds are forced to either integrate into Turkish society as best as they can or support the Kurdish militants. This strengthens the cycle of violence as a greater percentage of Kurds within Turkey become disaffected and radicalized.

The Kurdish militants are supported internationally by the Kurdish diaspora and other states and non-state groups opposed to U.S. influence in the region. This, combined with the increasing level of grievance among Kurds within Turkey, indicates that the militants will be able to sustain their campaign indefinitely.

Attempts by international actors are made to resolve the conflict, but are hampered by several factors. The U.S. cannot be left out of a peace process, but the U.S. support for Turkey makes it difficult for U.S. policy makers to be considered honest brokers. The viciousness of the attacks by the militants in conjunction with the "war on terror" makes it difficult for the international community to engage with Kurds, while the continued failure of cease fires and peace initiatives makes it increasingly difficult to get parties to the table. Finally, any progress toward peaceful reconciliation is often undercut by acts of violence on both sides. The cycle of violence has, in effect, given hardliners a veto over any peace process.

¹⁴See Leila Harris, "Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project," *Society and Natural Resources* 15 (2002): 751.

Kurds as Tibetans: Successful Repression

The international war on terror, the terrorist bombings in Istanbul, and the continued small-scale violence between KADEK and the Turkish Army and Police combine to spark a large-scale counterinsurgency effort on the part of the Turkish state against Kurdish groups. The effort receives widespread support from the Turkish public.

The banning of all types of Kurdish associations, the large-scale arrests of suspected militants, and the destruction of numerous villages follow. The state of emergency in southeastern Turkey is reinstated. Turkey uses the state of emergency to increase its political, military, and economic control over the region.

While the Kurdish militants attempt to resist, the strength of the Turkish Army and Police eventually eliminates virtually all forms of overt resistance. The support from the Kurdish diaspora that reaches groups within Turkey is insufficient to support the Kurdish resistance. Kurdish groups form an exile government in Iraq, but are unable to mount an effective political or military response to Turkish policy.

The economic and geopolitical importance of Turkey, and the power of its allies, makes states wary of calling for a change in Turkey's Kurdish policy. The actions of international human rights and social justice NGOs can neither sway the actions of Turkey, nor weaken the support for Turkey by other states, nor provide enough support to Kurds to mount an effective resistance.

The counterinsurgency effort halts any progress toward the amelioration of Kurdish grievances. Moreover, both the terrorist attacks and the counterinsurgency campaign eliminate any political space for moderate Kurds. Kurds are forced to either integrate into Turkish society as best as they can or engage in passive resistance. Due to the absence of overt resistance and the level of Turkish control over the area, over time it becomes unclear exactly how much Kurdish resistance remains. This emboldens Turkey to declare the Kurdish problem solved.

Kurds as Basques: No War, No Peace

Although small-scale violence between KADEK and the Turkish Army and Police continues, several dynamics decrease the level of support for the radical Kurdish groups.

First, the Turkish state avoids any large-scale, provocative response to the small-scale attacks. Second, the government grants a measure of political autonomy to the municipal governments in the region. Language and cultural restrictions are also relaxed. The economic development plan for southeastern Turkey continues and begins to create greater economic opportunities for Kurds in the region.¹⁵ Although the implementation of these policies is messy and haphazard, they do help to ameliorate many of the grievances of the Kurdish population in southeastern Turkey.

Third, the possibility of joining the European Union shifts the attention of many Kurdish individuals within Turkey. The idea of a transnational Kurdish ethnic group existing throughout Turkey and the European Union begins to gain support at the expense of the idea of a territorial Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.

Despite these trends, a hard core of Kurdish militants remain, primarily individuals who fought with the PKK against the Turkish state during the 1990s. Support for these militants waxes and wanes in response to different developments both inside and outside of Turkey, but always remains relatively low. Nonetheless, this support is sufficient to sustain the militant groups, because their numbers are small and they primarily engage in small-scale attacks using guns and bombs.

¹⁵In the Spanish case, the economic development in the Basque region has already occurred. I use improving economic conditions as an analogue in the Kurdish case, but the parallel is not exact.

As a result of these dynamics, several moderate Kurdish political organizations have emerged with the goal of protecting and expanding the rights Kurds have within Turkey. While there is always a measure of controversy surrounding these groups because of the more radical Kurdish groups, these organizations do create a legitimate means for Kurds to express their concerns from within the Turkish political system.

Kurds as Québécois: Triumph of the Moderates

While continuing to hunt Kurdish militants, the Turkish state avoids any large-scale, provocative counter-insurgency efforts. Turkey continues to harmonize its domestic policies toward the Kurds with international norms of democracy and minority rights.¹⁶ The Turkish state grants a substantive basket of cultural, linguistic, and political rights to the Kurds in the southeast. The economic development plan for southeastern Turkey continues and begins to create greater economic opportunities for Kurds in the region.

Both a cause and effect of these changes is a more civic version of the Turkish identity, which is able to tolerate greater pluralism. Moreover, the political and economic changes in the southeast, over time, begin to break down the differences between the Kurds in the southeast and the more integrated Kurds in the rest of Turkey. This helps create a Kurdish–Turkish identity that is inclusive of Kurds throughout Turkey.

As a result of these changes, several moderate Kurdish political organizations emerge with the goal of protecting and expanding the rights Kurds have gained within Turkey. This creates a legitimate means for Kurds to express their concerns from within the Turkish political system.

Over time, Turks come to realize that the Kurds have significantly more loyalty to the Turkish state than was previously believed.¹⁷ While extremist groups remain, they are almost completely marginalized, and have no impact on Kurdish groups or Turkish politics.

Kurds as Azerbaijanis in Iran: Complex Integration

Although small-scale violence between KADEK and the Turkish Army and Police continues, several dynamics decrease the level of support for the radical Kurdish groups.

The Turkish state avoids any large-scale, provocative response and continues its economic development plan in southeastern Turkey. The Turkish government does not grant any form of political autonomy to predominantly Kurdish areas and still imposes restrictions on Kurdish cultural and linguistic practices, although these restrictions are not vigorously enforced. Kurds are able to produce some work in their own language and to interact with Kurds in greater Kurdistan.

This regional dynamic in southeastern Turkey takes place in a larger context in which identities throughout Turkey are shifting. Although claims of economic discrimination remain, many Kurds in Turkey rise into the economic elite. As a result of the successes of these integrated Kurds in Turkey, a viable Kurdish–Turkish identity begins to emerge. The stake these Kurdish-Turks have in the Turkish system makes them politically moderate in relation to the Kurdish militants in the

¹⁶In Canada's case, these democratic norms were already established. In the case of Turkey, the consolidation is coming as a result of European Union standards. The parallel is not exact and analysts should keep in mind the different dynamics created by a transitioning political system as opposed to a consolidated democracy.

¹⁷In the Canada case, this came about in part as a result of the failed referenda in Quebec. Such a referendum is unlikely in Turkey. As a result, this latent loyalty would be expressed in different ways.

southeast. At the same time, the Turkish state begins to promote a more civic version of the Turkish identity that allows for more pluralism.¹⁸

This identity shift is primarily the result of domestic factors, in particular the nature of the evolution and interaction of the Kurdish and Turkish identities within Turkey. As a result, diaspora Kurdish groups and Kurdish groups in neighboring states become more radical than Kurdish groups within Turkey. While they remain a potential threat, these outside groups have been unable to foster any significant protest or resistance within Turkey.

Over time, as a result of the lack of provocation by the Turkish state and the shift in underlying identity patterns, militant Kurdish groups cannot maintain a violent resistance movement. Kurdish political organizations remain, but they are content to work through established channels to demand greater cultural, political, and economic rights.

How Are the Scenarios Used?

After the scenarios are developed, the participants in the workshop should be led through a three-step process.

(1) Driving Forces

The first step is to identify what scenario analysts refer to as “driving forces.” Peter Schwartz describes driving forces as

the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine the story’s outcome Without driving forces there is no way to begin thinking through a scenario. They are a device for honing your original judgment, for helping you decide which factors will be significant and which factors will not. (Schwartz, 1996:101–102)

Schwartz provides some useful strategies in identifying and describing driving forces. He suggests that participants first identify “predetermined elements.” These are the “givens” that will be part of any scenario that can reasonably be envisioned. As a further guide, Schwartz provides a typology of these predetermined elements, including slow changing phenomena (i.e., demographic shifts), constrained situations (i.e., territorial borders, entrenched political institutions), phenomena “in the pipeline” (i.e., long-term infrastructure projects such as the GAP), and inevitable collisions (i.e., the secular-Islamic divide in Turkey) (Schwartz, 1996:111–112).

After using these predetermined elements to establish a common foundation across the potential scenarios, participants then need to identify the key axes along which the scenarios vary from one another. The next step is to analyze these key dimensions of difference in order to identify potential “Scenario Drivers” (Schwartz, 1996:244). These are the forces that create a turning point from one scenario to another, the key developments that would cause one scenario to unfold in place of another. For instance, the effectiveness of external support for militant Kurdish groups seems to be a crucial factor in determining whether the “Intractable Conflict” or the “Successful Repression” scenarios emerge, given a strong counterinsurgency effort on the part of the Turkish state.

In relation to the scenarios described above, a few of the key predetermined elements include the following:

¹⁸In the Iranian case, this is facilitated by the distinction between the more ethnic “Persian” identity and the more civic “Iranian” identity. Azerbaijanis in Iran are able to claim Iranian identity without relinquishing their Azerbaijani ethnic identity. This would be harder for the Kurds in Turkey to do. See Brenda Shaffer (2002: 211–212).

- The continued existence of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. As scenarios envisioning full assimilation of the Kurds into the Turkish identity were deemed to be unrealistic in this case, the continued existence of a Kurdish identity is a common factor among all the scenarios.
- The existence of Turkey with its current territorial borders and the set of institutions that make up the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Scenarios envisioning some sort of non-territorial, pan-Kurdish polity spanning several states were deemed to be unrealistic in this case.¹⁹
- The demography of the Kurds in Turkey, namely a concentration of Kurds in the southeast, but a large number of Kurds scattered throughout the rest of Turkey.

With these commonalities as a background, a few of the key Scenario Drivers that emerge are:

- The provocativeness of the Turkish state's counterinsurgency policy.
- The level and effectiveness of external support for militant Kurdish groups.
- The economic situation in southeast Turkey both in absolute terms and relative to Turkey's overall economic situation.
- The nature of the relationship between Kurds in the southeast and the more integrated Kurds in the rest of Turkey.
- The emergence of moderate Kurdish interest groups that are considered legitimate both by the Kurdish population and by the Turkish state.

Again these are provided as examples and as catalysts to spark discussion in the workshop. Participants in the problem-solving process should work on revising this list, adding, removing, reshaping both predetermined elements and scenario drivers, to better capture the dynamic being represented.²⁰

Once a list is developed, participants should spend time understanding the nature of the scenario drivers on the list. Several questions could be asked, including:

- What is the trend in relation to the driving force? For instance, is the overall economic situation improving or getting worse in southeast Turkey?
- What are the links between the forces? Are they interrelated? What are the interaction effects? For instance, does the level of external support for Kurdish militant groups affect the relationship of Kurds in the southeast to Kurds in the rest of Turkey? Can moderate Kurdish groups be effective in the absence of economic growth in the Southeast?
- What are the underlying factors that shape the driving forces? For instance, what are the internal-political dynamics affecting the nature of counterinsurgency policy.

Workshop organizers may also wish to use traditional conflict analysis techniques with the participants, such as conflict mapping or the conflict tree, to facilitate a discussion on the nature and impact of the driving forces.²¹

In many ways, the discussion of the scenario drivers is the crux of the CASES approach. If the scenarios have been presented properly, the idea of the scenario driver should be intuitive—what might create one scenario instead of another? But through this simple idea, it is possible to create a substantive discussion of the issues at the core of the conflict.

¹⁹Case studies of these kinds of arrangements could have included the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland and the non-territorial federal arrangements instituted for indigenous groups in Canada.

²⁰Even the notion of a list is arbitrary. The driving forces could be represented by, for instance, a matrix or a flow chart.

²¹For a good description of these and other conflict analysis techniques, see Fisher (2000).

(2) Potential Interventions

It is important at this point to distinguish two different purposes of scenario analysis. The first, which might be called a reactive approach, is to design robust strategies to reach a goal that will be successful across a wide range of scenarios. The second, more proactive approach, is to develop strategies to make it more likely that one or more preferred scenarios emerge. This former model is most often used by corporations. The goal of most corporations is to remain profitable regardless of what the future holds. Therefore, they desire strategies that will be effective across a wide range of future scenarios. Responding effectively to future scenarios can be distinguished, however, from attempting to shape the future.

The proactive approach, however, is most often used when scenario analysis is applied to social dynamics with an inescapable ethical component. Clearly, peacebuilding activities fall into this category. The fundamental goal of any peacebuilding process is to create sustainable peace. Thus, the goal of a scenario analysis project, which is part of a peacebuilding process, must be to identify interventions that make it more likely that certain scenarios will emerge, namely scenarios that draw society closer to the ideal of sustainable peace.

Thus, the second step in the process is to identify specific interventions that may help to bring about the desired scenarios. These interventions should flow from the driving forces identified by the group. It is difficult here to say what these interventions might be. Much depends on who is involved in the problem-solving process. Academics can do different things than can senior policy makers, who can do different things than can grass-roots activists, and so on.

For instance, let us assume that the participants, who are primarily members of civil society organizations, have focused on the economic situation in southeastern Turkey. They could develop interventions that promote participatory development in southeastern Turkey, thereby ensuring that Kurds benefit from economic growth in the area. Alternatively, let us assume that the participants are senior-level academics and researchers who have focused on the state's counterinsurgency policy. They could develop an intervention to educate military and political leaders on effective, non-provocative counterinsurgency strategies.

(3) Action Plans and Next Steps

This step is optional. It is often important in Track II processes to remove the commitment to act. In this way, participants are more free to discuss a wide range of possibilities. On the other hand, in some situations participants have "workshop-fatigue," and become very frustrated if no plan of action is developed. If the facilitators judge that the participants wish to take concrete steps, they should work with the participants to develop an action plan, including both an overall implementation strategy and a set of concrete next steps. Of course, the action plan should flow from the scenarios and the proposed interventions.

Iterated Analysis

The analysis of the driving forces and the development of potential interventions can be aided by an iterated scenario analysis process that generates comparison cases related to issues raised by the participants about specific driving forces or specific proposed interventions. For instance, a set of comparison cases that provides a range of outcomes on the specific issue of counterinsurgency strategies or external support for militants could be generated. A set of comparison cases could also be generated related to the success of participatory development strategies as a peacebuilding tool in regions where the majority of the population belongs to an ethnic minority group. The scenarios represented by these comparison cases would

be nested within the macro-scenarios created by the initial analysis. Assuming sufficient time and resources, these more focused analyses could be developed between workshops as part of an ongoing problem-solving process.²²

Conclusion

The goal of this article was twofold. First, it sought to show how large-scale data sets on conflict, such as MAR, can be used to produce a set of scenarios that represent the plausible future trajectories of a given conflict. Second, the article discussed how such scenarios might be used as part of a Track II process in which various types of local conflict managers are brought together in order to analyze the conflict, develop a common understanding of the conflict, and develop potential peacebuilding initiatives. In particular, the article sought to show how more traditional scenario-planning exercises, particularly those that have been used as part of a conflict management process, can be improved by constructing scenarios based on actual cases.

Virtually no one would deny that those attempting to manage violent conflicts could benefit from relevant information about similar cases of conflict. Despite this, there exists no mechanism to systematically provide this information in a timely manner. Instead practitioners tend to rely on the personal experience of those within the conflict management team. Such experience is necessarily limited, even with the most highly experienced teams. In contrast, CASES provides information systematically culled from hundreds of potentially relevant cases and presented in a form that is readily accessible to conflict managers at all levels. The man in Guyana was right to ask about Trinidad. Knowing how Trinidad “fixed it” might have helped and we should have been able to give him that information.

Appendix


See Tables A1 and A2 for the list of potential comparison cases and the CASES process respectively.

TABLE A1: List of Potential Comparison Cases for the Kurds in Turkey

<i>Group Name</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Group Name</i>	<i>Country</i>
Acehnese	Indonesia	Malay-Muslims	Thailand
Arabs	Iran	Moros	Philippines
Azerbaijanis	Iran	Nuba	Sudan
Baluchis	Pakistan	Palestinians	Israel
Baganda	Uganda	Québécois	Canada
Basters	Namibia	Saharawis	Morocco
Basques	France	Sardinians	Italy
Basques	Spain	Sikhs	India
Catalans	Spain	Shans	Burma
Corsicans	France	Somalis	Ethiopia
Diolas in Casamance	Senegal	South Tyrolians	Italy
Hungarians	Yugoslavia	Southerners	Sudan
Karens	Burma	Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka
Kashmiris	India	Tibetans	China
Kosovo Albanians	Yugoslavia	Turkmen	Iran
Kurds	Iraq	Zanzibaris	Tanzania
Kurds	Iran		

²²A variety of data sets could be used to create these more focused sets of scenarios.

TABLE A2: The CASES Process



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